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and omissions. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite the existence of a vast literature on the robustness and optimality of
monetary policy rules, relatively little attention has been given to the issue of
monetary-￿scal policy interactions. A number of papers have examined the
interdependence between ￿scal and monetary policies using New Keynesian
dynamic general equilibrium models1, or game-theoretic models2, but none of
these models have been tested empirically, with the exception of Muscatelli et
al. (2003). In this paper we estimate a small econometric model for the USA
over the sample period 1970-2001, and analyse the performance of monetary
rules in the presence of ￿scal stabilizers. Our structural model is based on
a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
The innovation in this paper is two-fold. First, we extend some current
DGSE models to include a wider range of ￿scal policy transmission channels.
Second, our model is estimated, in contrast to some attempts to calibrate
or numerically simulate these models. Finally, the focus of our paper is on
the way in which inertial policy rules interact with inertia in the structural
model caused by the presence of non-optimising consumers and ￿rms.
Conventional New Keynesian DSGE models (as discussed for instance in
Gal￿, 2003) typically provide a very limited role for ￿scal policy. The standard
forward-looking IS curve is based on the assumption of "Ricardian" forward-
looking consumers, who have full access to complete ￿nancial markets. This
assumption is contradicted by the empirical evidence on the permanent in-
come hypothesis which supports the view that a signi￿cant proportion of
consumers are non-Ricardian. Moreover, conventional DSGE models can-
not rationalize the positive response of consumption to public expenditure
shocks. To account for these eﬀects, we adopt the innovation proposed by
Gal￿ et al. (2002), who assume that a fraction of households are constrained
to consume out of current income. By doing so, we are also able to model
the demand eﬀect of other ￿scal variables, i.e. taxes and transfers. On the
supply side of the economy, to our knowledge existing empirical N-K DSGE
models neglect ￿scal distortions. In this paper we make a ￿r s ta t t e m p ta t
estimating the empirical eﬀect of the tax wedge on the Phillips curve in N-K
1See for example Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2001), Be-
nigno and Woodford (2003) for an analysis of ￿scal and monetary interactions in theoret-
ical models. Perez and Hiebert (2002) and Zagaglia (2002) have experimented with DGE
model simulations which include some ￿scal closure rules.
2See Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001).
1DSGE models.
We use our estimated model to undertake a number of dynamic simu-
lations, examining the responses of the endogenous variables (including the
policy instruments) to unanticipated structural and policy shocks.
Finally, we conduct some policy analysis with our estimated models. This
allows us to consider whether the introduction of endogenous ￿scal policy
rules markedly changes the performance of the monetary policy rule. Earlier
contributions (Muscatelli et al., 2003) had found that countercyclical ￿scal
policy can be welfare-reducing in the presence of optimizing monetary policy-
makers. In contrast to this evidence, by introducing a role for taxation in the
DSGE model, we ￿nd that automatic stabilizers based on taxation tend to
be more eﬃcient than those based on government spending. We also analyze
the impact of inertia (persistence) in the ￿scal rule and in the structural
model on the performance of the monetary and ￿scal policy rules, and ￿nd
that inertial taxation rules tend to be more eﬃcient than inertial government
expenditure rules. Finally we con￿rm the results in Gali et al. (2003) that
the presence of rule of thumb consumers tends to create more instability in
the model (by increasing the variability of output and in￿ation following an
in￿ation shock), but also ￿nd that automatic stabilizers based on taxation
tend to oﬀset the impact of rule-of-thumb consumers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will
brie￿y survey the existing literature. In Section 3, we outline the structure of
our estimated model and the empirical methodology. In Section 4, we report
our estimates and examine some dynamic simulations from our estimated
models, while in Section 5 we examine the performance and interaction of
the monetary and ￿scal policy rules. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Existing Literature
Much of the literature on ￿scal-monetary policy interactions has focused
on whether monetary and ￿scal policy operate as strategic complements or
substitutes. Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001) explore the interdependence
between the ￿scal authority and the central bank in a model where the latter
has only partial control over in￿ation, which is also directly aﬀected by the
￿scal policy stance. They show that in equilibrium the two policy rules are
complements when ￿scal expansions have non-Keynesian (contractionary) ef-
fects on output and in￿ation. Buti, Roeger and in￿t Veld (2001) suggest that
2the speci￿c form of interdependence between ￿scal and monetary policies,
i.e. the alternative between strategic substitutability and complementarity,
should not necessarily be interpreted in terms of con￿ict or cooperation, and
might be shock-dependent. In their model supply shocks unambiguously in-
duce con￿icting policies, whereas the opposite holds true for demand shocks.
Empirical contributions in this area are mainly based on panel data tech-
niques and VAR analyses. Cross-sectional or panel data examine the rela-
tionship between ￿scal and monetary policies over the cycle. Work by MØlitz
(1997, 2000) and Wyplosz (1999) broadly supports the view that the two poli-
cies have acted as strategic substitutes over the last 2-3 decades. Von Hagen,
Hughes-Hallett and Strauch (2001) ￿nd that the interdependence between
the two policymakers is asymmetric: looser ￿scal stances match monetary
contractions, whereas monetary policies broadly accommodate ￿scal expan-
sions. Muscatelli et al. (2001) examine the interaction between ￿scal and
monetary policy instruments using conventional VAR and Bayesian VAR
models for several G7 economies, and show that the ￿scal shocks identi￿ed
in the VAR have a signi￿cant impact3.T h e y￿nd that the result of strategic
substitutability does not hold uniformly for all countries. Moreover, they
report strong evidence that the linkage between ￿scal and monetary policy
has shifted post-1980, when ￿scal and monetary policies became much more
complementary. The main problem with this empirical literature literature
is that without a structural model it is diﬃcult to interpret the empirical
correlations between the two policy variables. In the work of MØlitz (1997,
2000) and Wyplosz (1999) one cannot tell whether the correlation between
the policy instruments over the cycle derives from systematic policy responses
or from responses to structural or policy shocks. In the VARs estimated by
Muscatelli et al. (2001) the focus is on the reaction of policy instruments to
other policy shocks, but it is notoriously diﬃcult to interpret implicit policy
reaction functions in VARs especially if the ￿true￿ underlying structural model
is forward-looking. More recently, Muscatelli et al. (2003) examine the in-
teraction of monetary and ￿scal policies using an estimated New Keynesian
dynamic general equilibrium model for the US. In contrast to earlier work
they show that the strategic complementarity or substitutability of ￿scal and
monetary policy depends crucially on the types of shocks hitting the econ-
3The number of contributions applying VAR techniques is still limited. This may be
due to the critique in Mountford and Uhlig (2002) that true ￿scal policy surprises may be
diﬃcult to detect in a VAR model.
3omy, and on the assumptions made about the underlying structural model.
The greater complementarity of ￿scal and monetary policy seen in the 1990s
compared to the 1980s was due to the changing nature of the underlying
shocks.
Our focus in this paper is diﬀerent. We estimate a N-K DSGE model
which, in contrast to our earlier work and other attempts to estimate struc-
tural New Keynesian models4, allows for a richer range of transmission chan-
nels for ￿scal policy, whilst still maintaining a model where the structural
parameters are estimated using econometrics. This model is then used to
conduct policy analysis to see how ￿scal and monetary policy interact and
what implications the degree of inertia in the structural model and in the
policy rules has for monetary and ￿scal policy design. The introduction of
central bank independence in most of the industrialised economies has raised
the issue of whether ￿scal and monetary policies are properly co-ordinated.
One motivation for this paper is to show that ￿scal stabilizers, which can be
shown to be counterproductive in standard DSGE models (e.g. Muscatelli
et al., 2003)5 signi￿cantly improve welfare in an economy characterized by
an important proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers. In particular, taxa-
tion rules based on automatic stabilisers can be shown to have a welfare-
enhancing eﬀect. Our results are complementary to those obtained using
diﬀerent frameworks by other researchers. Gordon and Leeper (2003) ￿nd,
using a calibrated model for the US economy, that ￿scal stabilization poli-
cies tends to destabilize the business cycle because of their impact on debt
service obligations. Jones (2002) uses an estimated stochastic growth model
(without price stickiness) for the US to show that ￿scal policy had limited
stabilization eﬀects in the post-war period.
3 A New-Keynesian Structural Model
We use a small forward-looking N-K DSGE model, comprising a dynamic
IS model for output and a ￿New Keynesian Phillips Curve￿ speci￿cation for
4See Gali et al. (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002).
5In Muscatelli et al. (2003) our ￿scal rules are estimated and we do not examine
alternative forms for these rules. In that paper we show that countercyclical ￿scal policy
can be welfare-reducing if ￿scal and monetary policy rules are inertial and not co-ordinated.
Our conjecture in that paper was that this surprising result was probably due to the
interaction of highly inertial estimated monetary and ￿scal policy rules. In this paper we
study ￿scal policy rules in a DSGE model which involves a richer range of ￿scal channels.
4in￿ation.
3.1 Households
We assume two types of households. Households in the ￿rst group, i,b e n e ￿t
from full access to the capital markets and are therefore free to optimize.
The proportion of optimising consumers in the economy is given as (1 − ϑ).

























t represents consumption of a basket of goods (to be de￿ned
below), Ht is an index of external habits, ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion, No
t is the level of employment, and εl is a shock to labour supply.










Optimizing consumers maximize (1) subject to their intertemporal budget
constraint, which is expressed in real terms as:
(1/rt)a
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where consumers hold their ￿nancial wealth (at) in the form of one-period
state-contingent securities, which yield a return of rt. The optimizing con-
sumer￿s disposable income consists of labour income wtNoi
t plus the dividends
from the pro￿ts of the imperfectly competitive ￿rms Di
t, plus public transfers
GTRi
t minus personal taxes T i
t, lump-sum by assumption.
As in Gal￿ et al. (2002) we assume that a proportion ϑ of households
follow a rule of thumb, and consume out of current disposable income. This
admittedly ad hoc assumption may be justi￿ed assuming myopia or limited
participation to capital markets. We also assume that rule-of-thumb con-
sumers supply a constant amount of labour6, NRT. Thus the consumption
function of the representative rule-of-thumb consumer amounts to:






, levied on rule-of-thumb consumers are always nil. This result
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Firms￿ production technology is assumed to be a simple Cobb-Douglas func-
tion of labour and capital for each consumption good variety z. Capital is
assumed ￿xed and normalized to unity:
Yt(z)=A(Nt(z))
1−α (5)
We introduce ￿scal distortions by assuming that taxes on labour take the










PR is the tax rate per unit of employed labour, i.e. t∗
PR = T∗
N ,
where T∗are the total revenues from the payroll tax.
T u r n i n gn e x tt ot h em o d e lo f￿rms￿ pricing behavior, we consider a stan-
dard model of monopolistic competition with sticky prices, as set out in Gal￿,
Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001), and Leith and Malley (2002)8. Total con-
sumption is given by a standard CES function of imperfectly substitutable



















Given this, consumption of each variety of the consumption good is given
by:
would never obtain in our model, where taxes and transfers are explicitly modeled. Thus,
for sake of simplicity we assume a constant labour supply. Since consumption cannot be





for any given level of
the real wage.
7This implies that the optimizing consumer￿s choice between leisure and consumption
is not aﬀected.











where Pt(z) is the price of good z,a n dP is the consumption price index













Sticky prices are incorporated into this model, by assuming a Calvo pric-
ing mechanism, with some proportion of ￿rms adjusting their prices every
period, and the rest supplying output on demand, at a constant price.
3.3 The IS and the Phillips curve
By log-linearizing the model around steady state we are then able to de-
rive the forward-looking IS and the ￿New Keynesian Phillips curve (see the
Appendix for a proof) 9:
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where b gt is government spending excluding government transfers d GTR.
￿Hatted￿ lower-case variables represent percentage deviations from the steady
9We ignore investment and the external sector. Arguably, the open-economy considera-
tions are less important to the USA, which is the focus of our analysis here. The extension
of our modeling approach to the open economy is left to further work.
7state. ￿Barred￿ variables denote steady-state values. At ￿rst sight eq. (10)
looks very complex. In fact, by imposing no habit, λ =0 , and the absence
of rule-of-thumb consumers, NRT
N = ϑ =0 , eq. (10) would collapse to a
cancellare(standard) purely forward looking IS curve. Note that consump-
tion habit introduces a link between current and past output (as in Carroll,
2000, Leith and Malley, 2002; Smets and Wouters, 2002). Moreover, the
presence of non-optimizing consumers establishes a link between the demand
for goods, net personal taxes, d GTR− T,a n dt h er e a lw a g e .F i s c a lp o l i c yi m -
pacts on output in three ways. First, through the usual resource withdrawal
eﬀect of government consumption, b gt; second, through the impact of net
personal taxes d GTR− T on the current disposable income of rule-of-thumb
consumers. Third, through the impact of payroll taxes T∗on the real wage
of rule-of-thumb consumers10. Finally, rule-of-thumb consumers weaken the
impact of interest rate policy on aggregate demand. As shown in Gal￿ et al.
(2003) this may have important implications for the conduct of monetary
policy. indeed, our estimates con￿rm that rule-of-thumb consumers weaken
the output response to interest rate changes.
It is important to note that whilst government spending impacts on the
consumption behaviour of optimising consumers via the resource-withdrawal
eﬀect, taxation impacts through its eﬀect on disposable income for rule-
of-thumb consumers, and hence via the external habit (total consumption)
variable. This ensures that government spending enters via a distributed
lag in (10) which sum to zero, while personal and payroll taxes enter in
diﬀerences, with coeﬃcients of diﬀerent size. As we shall see below, this
drives some of the results of the model.
Turning to the Phillips curve, we de￿ne (1−ξ) as the proportion of ￿rms
adjusting their prices every period. A share γ of these is assumed to index
prices to in￿ation in the previous period11, whereas the rest, (1 − γ),s e t
their prices optimally to maximize expected discounted real pro￿ts12,w i t ha
discount factor β.
10From equations (4) and (6) it should be clear that, in each period, the equilibrium real
wage is inversely related to employment and the payroll tax. In the Appendix we explain
why the rate of change of these variables aﬀects current output.
11This was pioneered by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). Similar backward-looking elements
can be introduced to the NKPC equation by introducing indexation of all non-re-optimised
prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001, and Woodford, 2002, chapter 3).
12A similar speci￿cation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be obtained by making
the indexation process part of the optimisation process (see Smets and Wouters, 2002).
8The ￿rms￿ optimization, together with the assumptions about Calvo pric-
ing and indexation lead to an expression for price-setting which can be log-
linearized to yield (see the Appendix for details):
b πt =
γb πt−1 + βξEtb πt+1
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
+
(1 − γ)(1 − ξ)(1 − γξ)
[ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))][1 + (α/(1 − α))θ]
b st (11)
where b st is the percentage change from steady state of the labour cost
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+b nt−b yt
Equations (10) and (11) constitute our structural model. It is impor-
tant to note that in estimating (11), we treat real wages and employment
as exogenous. Other recent contributions (Leith and Malley, 2002, Smets
and Wouters, 2002) estimate wage equations, and adding a wage equation
would have enabled us to consider the possibility of sticky wage dynamics.
However, this would have also added to the complexity of the model. As dis-
cussed below, when simulating our model we make some allowance for wage
adjustment.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Scope of the Study
We now turn to the empirical results14. We estimate the two equations (10)
and (11), using US quarterly data, over the sample period 1970(1)-2001(2).
The data de￿nitions used are reported in the Data Appendix.
The data have been seasonally adjusted, and to capture the spirit of the
NK models as log-linearizations, the data are transformed so that the vari-
13Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001) specify (10) in terms of average real marginal




14The estimation was carried out using RATS, version 5.
9ables are expressed in deviations from the ￿steady state￿15. Real variables are
de-trended16, whilst the series on in￿ation and the nominal interest rate (the
federal funds rate) are demeaned. Note that as the in￿ation rate and inter-
e s tr a t ea l w a y se n t e rt h em o d e lt o g e t h e r ,a l lt h ee q u a t i o n sa r e￿ b a l a n c e d ￿i n
terms of the levels of integration of the dependent and explanatory variables.
The government spending data (G) is total government spending exclud-
ing transfers and interest payments, whilst we use employers￿ social security
contributions as payroll taxes (T ∗), and government transfers minus personal
t a x e sa s( GTR− T).
4.2 Estimation Methods
The New Keynesian model consists of equations that are non-linear in para-
meters. Following Hansen (1982) a model with rational expectations suggests
some natural orthogonality restrictions that can be used in the generalized
methods of moments (GMM) framework. We estimate (10), (11) using GMM.
Each equation estimated using GMM is of the form:
yit = fi(θi,zit)+uit (12)
where for each equation i, yit is the vector of dependent variables, θi is
the (ai ￿ 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and zit is the
(ki ￿ 1) vector of explanatory variables. The GMM approach is based on
the fact that e θi, the true value of θi, has the property E[hi( e θi,wit)] = 0,
where wit ≡ ( y0
it,z0
it,x0
it),a n dxit is an (ri ￿ 1) vector of instruments that
are correlated with zit. GMM then chooses the estimate θi so as to make the
sample moment as close as possible to the population moment of zero. In
our estimates we use four lags of the dependent variable and the exogenous
variables as instruments. The validity of these instruments can be tested for
each equation i using Hansen￿s J-test, which is distributed as a χ2(ri − ai)
statistic under the null of valid orthogonality conditions.
GMM or IV estimation has been used by a number of authors to estimate
15Which is commonplace in this literature (see Smets and Wouters, 2002, Leith and
Malley, 2002).
16We experimented with both a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter and regression on a polynomial
(cubic) trend for the real variables, and using CBO and OECD data on potential output.
The results reported here use a HP trend (λ =1 6 0 0 ).
10NK models17. One problem is that the estimated IS and NKPC equations are
highly nonlinear in parameters, and the rank condition for identi￿cation is
not met unless a number of parameters in these two equations are ￿xed. We
follow Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001) and Leith and Malley (2002) in
imposing restrictions on some of the parameters. We ￿x θ =4 , implying a
price-mark-up18 of 30%, 1−α =0 .6 and that19 the habit formation parameter
on aggregate consumption is unity (λ =1 ) .I n t h e N K P C e q u a t i o n , w e
















+ T ∗)=0 .095. Moreover, in the IS equation
we impose that the following steady-state values are given by their average


































suggested by the theory in the IS
equation (see the derivation in the Appendix).
However, it is worth noting that even with these restrictions, because of
the absence of any cross-equation restrictions21, the structural parameters
estimates are poorly de￿ned. Therefore, as we note below, we had to impose
additional restrictions and to use a grid-search procedure in order to obtain
parameter estimates that were statistically well-de￿ned.
17For instance, Gal￿, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Kara
and Nelson (2002), Muscatelli et al. (2003).
18This follows Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). It is a lower value of the elasticity
of substitution than that used by Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001) and Leith and
Malley (2002), but in practice the estimates of the other parameters did not seem to
be very sensitive to changes in the value of θ. However, a higher mark-up does seem to
be more sensible given that marginal costs exclude capital costs in this framework. In
addition, a higher value of θ would imply an implausibly small direct eﬀect of output on
prices through the marginal cost term.
19In our earlier study, Muscatelli et al. (2003), where we estimate λ freely in a simpler





















simply equal to the labour share in equilibrium, which we set equal to (1− α)=0 .6.
21Unlike Leith and Malley (2002) the discount factor β does not enter our IS equation
as our habit formation is based on external habits (￿keeping up with the Joneses￿). See
also Carroll (2000) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
114.3 Model Estimates
Table 1 reports the estimated New Keynesian model using GMM over the
full sample period. In estimating the NK output equation, we use the ex ante
real interest rate (b rt = b it − Etb πt+1), where b it is the federal funds rate. As
noted above, we found that the parameter estimates were relatively imprecise,
even after imposing the restriction suggested by theory that (β,γ,ξ,NRT/N)
should all be less than unity. For the NKPC equation we conducted a grid
search to minimise the standard error of the estimate, and ￿xed the discount
factor β at 0.99, a value consistent with that used by Smets and Wouters
(2002), but larger than that estimated by Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido
(2001), Leith and Malley (2002) and Muscatelli et al. (2003). This improved
the precision of the other parameter estimates. For the output equation, we
estimated the model in two stages. Note from (10) that if one estimates this
equation without imposing any restrictions on the parameters, by dividing







,w h e r eλ is been ￿xed at unity. Note also that by dividing the











, where again recall that C
Y is ￿xed at its sample






which are 3.18 and 0.839 respectively. We can also compute asymptotic
standard errors for these two parameters. We re-estimate (10) having ￿xed





from the ￿rst stage of the estimation to ￿nd
estimates for NRT
N and ϑ. T h i si m p r o v e dt h ep r e c i s i o no ft h ee s t i m a t e sf o r
the latter parameters.
The overall ￿t for the two equations is good. The R2 statistic for (10)
is 0.92 and for (11) is 0.98. The Hansen test for the two equations are
respectively 39.2 and 35.4, which are distributed as a χ2(27) statistic under
the null of valid instruments. The null hypothesis of valid instruments is not
rejected at the 5% signi￿cance level.
Our point estimates suggest that about 37% of consumers are rule-of-
thumb consumers, whilst 84% of total consumption in steady state is given by
optimising consumers. Rule-of-thumb consumers account for about 59% of
total employment. Our estimates of the Calvo parameter suggest that about
57% adjust their prices every period, which is a slightly higher proportion
than that estimated by Gal￿ et al. (2001) and Muscatelli et al. (2003). Of
12these, about half simply index prices.




























4.4 Dynamic and Stochastic Simulations
Having estimated our structural model, we now perform a number of dy-
namic simulation experiments to investigate the properties of this simple NK
model22, and the transmission of ￿scal and monetary policies.
We focus on the dynamic model solution, shocking each structural equa-
tion and policy equation in turn, to simulate the eﬀects of a structural or
policy variable shock on the other endogenous variables in the model. This
allows us to examine the properties of the model, and the response of output
and in￿ation to policy and structural shocks. Essentially this involves simu-
lating the model without any reference to actual data. The variables treated
as independent in the estimated model i.e. government transfers (GTR
t+1),t h e
22The model is solved using Winsolve version 3.0 (see Pierse, 2000), which provides
numerical solutions for linear and non-linear rational expectations models. We solve our
model using the Stacked Newton method in Winsolve. In solving the models with struc-
tural shocks (and further below with policy shocks) these are treated as unanticipated by
economic agents.
13real wage ( d w − pt)a n de m p l o y m e n t( b nt), are simulated as follows: govern-
ment transfers are simply assumed to be constant. On the other hand we do
wish to endogenize the real wage and employment. In our simulations, we as-
sume limited wage stickiness by postulating that nominal wages are indexed
to in￿a t i o nw i t hao n e - p e r i o dl a g 23, whilst employment is determined by a
log-linearization of the short-run production technology (5). To simulate the
model, we close it by adding a Taylor rule for the federal funds rate. In order
to provide a baseline for an analysis of inertial rules below, we assume a very
simple type of forward-looking non-inertial Taylor rule:
b it =1 .5(Etb πt+1)+0 .5(b yt) (13)
Excluding inertia from this Taylor rule has the advantage of allowing
us to focus on the simulation properties of the structural model. As we
shall see below (Section 5.1.1), an inertial monetary policy rule implies a
considerable period of monetary expansion following an in￿ation increase.
Excluding inertia allows us to focus on the structural properties of the ￿scal
channels in the model rather than on its performance when monetary policy is
very inertial. The results of the dynamic model solution are shown in Figures
1-5. These display the responses of output, in￿ation and the real interest rate,
following a temporary 1% shock to, respectively, the output, in￿ation, and
nominal interest rate (the federal funds rate) equation, and to government
spending and taxation. In the case of taxation we assume that there is a
proportionate shock to both payroll and personal taxes. The initial shock is
1% and this then recedes with a 0.5 autoregressive parameter, and is set to
zero after 4 quarters. Note that the government spending shock produces a
positive impact on output (see Gal￿ et al., 2002). As we shall see below, this
result is not altered by the introduction of feedback rules for ￿scal policy. It
is interesting that by estimating a NK model with rule-of-thumb consumers
we obtain estimated parameters which support Gal￿ et al.￿s (2002) conjecture
that non-optimising consumers can explain the positive correlation between
government spending shocks and output. Turning to taxation, as expected a
temporary taxation shock tends to reduce output through its impact on IS,
and increases in￿ation through the taxation wedge. As an illustration of the
23The absence of a wage-setting equation is less problematic than might seem at ￿rst
sight. If one looks at US data from the 1990s, one can see that real wages and employment
were far less volatile around their trend during the 1990s. Thus the assumption that wages
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Figure 1: Output Shock
impact of the greater inertia caused by rule-of-thumb consumers, in the limit
as the proportion of rule of thumb consumers fall to zero, the output increase
following an output shock is about 25% smaller, and the system converges
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Figure 2: In￿ation Shock
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Figure 5: Taxation Shock
175 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions and
Policy Design
5.1 Monetary and Fiscal Rules
Having examined the dynamic properties of our estimated model, we now
turn to the issue of policy design. As noted above, the earlier literature on
monetary-￿scal interactions focused exclusively on understanding whether
monetary and ￿scal policies have tended to act together over the cycle. A
more important issue is whether ￿scal policies, and in particular the auto-
matic stabilizers considered here, actually assist or impede the eﬀorts of an
independent central bank which adopts a forward-looking in￿ation targeting
rule. More precisely, how should automatic stabilizers be designed in order
to ensure that monetary and ￿scal policy act in concert, i.e. as strategic
complements?
In an earlier paper, Muscatelli et al. (2003), we presented evidence that
estimated ￿scal policy rules for the US appeared to be welfare-reducing, which
seemed to accord with the evidence (using diﬀerent modeling approaches) in
Gordon and Leeper (2003) and Jones (2002). From the point of view of a
central bank adopting an optimal policy rule designed to minimize a stan-
dard quadratic loss function in deviations of output, in￿ation and changes in
the policy instrument (the interest rate). We are now able to re-examine the
issue in a model where ￿scal policy may play a more important role because
rule-of-thumb consumers only indirectly react to the interest rate rule24.F u r -
thermore, the current model considers some additional additional channels
of transmission of ￿scal policy: taxation eﬀects on consumption through liq-
uidity constrained consumers, and taxation wedge eﬀects on in￿ation, as well
as interaction eﬀects due to the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. In ad-
dition, instead of focusing on estimated ￿scal rules25, we will consider a more
systematic analysis of diﬀerent rules for ￿scal stabilizers.
24As shown in Gal￿ et al. (2003), R-O-T consumers are aﬀected by interest rate changes
only to the extent that the real wage adjusts following the new labour conditions deter-
mined by the optimising consumers￿ reaction to such interest rate changes
25There is considerable evidence that estimated ￿scal rules are not very stable because
of the existence of diﬀerent ￿scal regimes. Favero and Monacelli (2003) identify a number
of Ricardian and non-Ricardian ￿scal regimes for the USA.
185.1.1 Monetary Rule
Before turning to the issue of how one might design robust ￿scal rules, let us
turn ￿rst to monetary policy. Unlike ￿s c a lp o l i c yr u l e s ,w eh a v eab e t t e ri d e a
of how monetary policy has behaved in recent times, especially in the case
of the US, where the institutional framework has not changed markedly for
the Fed. There have been a number of attempts to estimate forward-looking
interest rate rules for the US, following the seminal work of Clarida et al.
(1998). Although there might be some concern that monetary policy rules
have shown some instability over time26, Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998,
2000) highlight only one particular shift in the Fed￿s monetary policy rule
around the early 1980s, during the Volcker chairmanship of the Fed.
In order to simulate monetary-￿scal policy interactions, we estimate a
forward-looking monetary policy rule for the sample period 1982(1)-2001(2).
Our estimated monetary rule for the nominal interest rate b it follows a form
similar to the standard forward-looking Taylor rule speci￿cation which has
become commonplace in the literature27 (see Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler, 1998,
2000; Muscatelli et al. 2002; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002a,b),
b it = φ1Etb πt+q + φ2b yt+s + φ3b it−1 (14)
where the rule also allows for interest-rate smoothing (inertia) if φ3 6=0 .
In general we ￿nd that the best ￿t for this model is found for the speci￿c
case where q =1 ,s=0 28.
Table 2: Estimated Monetary Policy Rule







26Muscatelli, Trecroci and Tirelli (2002) provide some evidence that shifts may have
occurred even after the Volcker years. One other caveat is that estimated monetary policy
rules tend to misinterpret important discretionary policy shifts as unanticipated deviations
from the policy rule.
27The main diﬀerence is that we use a contemporaneous value of the output gap (see
Muscatelli et al. 2002) as opposed to expected future values, as in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998, 2000). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Giannoni and Woodford
(2002a,b). For an alternative approach to modeling interest rate responses, involving
nonlinearities in reaction functions, see Cukierman and Muscatelli (2001).
28See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) for a justi￿cation of why a short in￿ation-forecast
horizon might be optimal in cases where the degree of ￿rule of thumb￿ indexation (γ)o r
in￿ation inertia is high.
19The estimated parameters for (14) are reported in Table 2. The Hansen
test statistic is 24.73, which is insigni￿cant at the 5% level. The estimated
equation shows a signi￿cant output gap eﬀect on interest rates, and a long-
run eﬀect of expected in￿ation on nominal interest rates which is given by
φ4 =( φ1/(1−φ3)), and which is signi￿cantly greater than unity (φ4 =1 .817
with an asymptotic standard error equal to 0.095 ).
This estimated monetary policy rule provides us with a benchmark against
which to assess the performance of diﬀerent designs for automatic ￿scal sta-
bilizers in our structural model.
5.1.2 Fiscal Rules
We consider a simple backward-looking format for our ￿scal policy rules
(automatic stabilizers), following inter alia Van Den Noord (2000), Westaway
(2003) and Andres and Domenech (2003). This captures the more realistic
lagged response of ￿scal policy to macroeconomic variables due to automatic
stabilizers:
b gt = δ1b gt−1 − δ2b yt−1 (15)
b τt = ϕ1b τt−1 + ϕ2b yt−1 (16)
where b τt is the vector of our two tax measures, personal taxes b tt and
payroll taxes, b t∗
t. Our taxation rule therefore imposes the same adjustment
pattern on both taxes, and does not look at how a mix of tax measures might
improve the design of policy29. The importance of the taxation policy mix
is considered further below. Note that we do not allow for any feedback
of policy to budget de￿cits or debt accumulation30. Recall that our models
29Andres and Domenech (2003) provide an analysis of how diﬀerent tax measures might
impact on output and in￿ation variability.
30See for instance Bohn (1988) and Taylor (2000a,b). The lack of a debt or de￿cit
stabilization term raises the issue of whether our ￿scal rules imply a sustainable path
for government debt. Given that we are not conducting historical simulations with our
estimated models this not a problem, especially for small structural shocks. Obviously
where one wishes to conduct historical or counterfactual simulations (see Muscatelli et al.
2003), then one would need to check whether the implied path for government debt is
sustainable, and closely tracks that observed during the historical period analyzed. In this
paper we will focus instead on dynamic simulations following small shocks and the issue
of debt sustainability is less relevant, providing that we are considering suﬃciently small
20are estimated using detrended data and focus on stabilization over the cycle
rather than the shifts in ￿scal regimes which often accompany the correction
of de￿cits, or debt-correction strategies. Our ￿scal rules are largely capturing
automatic stabilizers through the autoregressive and the output gap terms.
For our baseline case, we set δ1 = ϕ1 =0 .6,δ 2 = ϕ2 =0 .5.Ac o e ﬃcient
of 0.5 on output is consistent with the empirical evidence in Van Den Noord
(2000) and adopted in studies on ￿scal stabilization (e.g. Westaway, 2003),
and are broadly consistent with the correlations for US ￿scal data over the
cycle (cf. Gordon and Leeper, 2003). We allow for an element of inertia
as empirical estimates of ￿scal policy rules suggest an important role for
an autoregressive term.We then consider a number of variants for the ￿scal
rules, and we also conduct some sensitivity analysis, to see to what extent the
performance of these ￿scal rules is aﬀected by small changes in the estimated
model parameters.
5.2 Government spending rules versus Taxation Rules
We now perform some dynamic simulation with our model, closing it by
adding the estimated monetary policy rule and the taxation and government
spending rules in (16) and (15). Rather than assuming a particular form
of welfare loss function, in what follows we consider how the introduction
of a ￿scal policy rule impacts on output and in￿ation variability (variance
frontiers) when it is combined with a monetary policy rule such as (14). Con-
ducting welfare analysis with a NK model such as ours is complex, because
of the presence of heterogeneous consumers (optimisers and rule-of-thumb
consumers)31, but computing variance frontiers allows a certain ranking of
p o l i c yr u l e s ,w h e r ei ti sa p p a r e n tt h a to n er u l ed o m i n a t e st h eo t h e ri nt e r m s
of reducing both output and in￿ation variability.
To construct the variance frontiers we apply a monetary policy rule where
the parameters φ2 and φ3 have the same values as those estimated and re-
p o r t e di nT a b l e2 ,b u tw h e r ew ea l l o wφ1 to vary32. We then compute the
shocks. Our ￿scal rules are close in spirit to those of Taylor (2000a, b), who ￿nds that
countercyclical ￿scal policy is almost entirely characterized by the working of automatic
stabilizers.
31See for instance Benigno and Woodford (2003). We are currently considering the
extension of our modeling framework to include some welfare analysis.
32The variance frontiers are plotted for values of φ1 which vary between between 0.2























Figure 6: Variance Frontiers and Monetary-Fiscal Interactions
standard deviation of output and in￿ation in dynamic simulations following
a shock to the Phillips Curve, and report these ￿variance frontiers￿ in the ￿g-
ures which follow. The results shown below do not seem to be too sensitive to
small changes in the values of the model parameters, in the sense of reversing
the rank of the various policy rules, and we shall return to this point below.
Figure 6 shows the variance frontiers when the model is simulated following
a temporary 1% in￿ation shock, combining the forward-looking monetary
policy rule with the ￿scal policy rules in four scenarios:
(i) where ￿scal policy is kept exogenously ￿xed, i.e. the automatic stabi-
lizers (15) (16) are kept switched oﬀ (labelled ￿none￿)
(ii) where only the government spending rule is switched on
(iii) where only the taxation feedback rule is switched on
(iv) where both rules are switched on (labelled ￿both￿)
is that it is often argued that estimated monetary policy rules tend to underestimate the
response of the central bank to shifts in expected in￿ation (and conversely overestimate
the degree of inertia) because central banks do not continuously change their monetary
stance.
22T h e r ea r et h r e ep o i n t st on o t ea b o u tt h e s er e s u l t s . T h e￿rst is that, in
contrast with Muscatelli et al. (2003), automatic stabilizers are no longer
welfare-reducing. In particular, countercyclical taxation policy seems able to
reduce the variance of both output and in￿ation. The second point to note is
that government spending does not have an unambiguous welfare-enhancing
eﬀect: introducing a feedback rule for government spending tends to shift
the variance frontier very slightly north-westwards, lowering the variability
of output, but at the expense of more variable in￿ation. This might explain
our earlier results on the welfare-reducing properties of ￿scal policies. Third,
introducing both automatic stabilizers is still preferable to having none, even
though the variance frontier shifts north-westwards, suggesting that taxa-
tion has a much greater impact on the variance frontier than government
spending.
The explanation for this result lies in the diﬀerent way in which govern-
ment spending and taxation operates in the model: government spending
varies the pro￿le of output but its impact is ultimately reversed, as the dis-
tributed lag eﬀect sums to zero. In contrast, taxation has an impact through
both the wedge (a level eﬀect) and through the IS curve (in diﬀerence terms),
and this is not reversed because of its impact on external habits.
To investigate the relative importance of personal taxes relative to payroll
taxes in stabilizing output and in￿ation, we repeated the above experiment
using only personal taxes and then using only payroll taxes. In general we
found that most of the stabilization eﬀect comes from payroll taxes through
their impact on the wedge, especially for cases where φ1 is high. The intuition
for this is straightforward: following an adverse shock to the Phillips curve,
output falls and as payroll taxes fall, they stabilise both in￿ation (through
the wedge eﬀect) and output (through the disposable income of rule-of-thumb
consumers). In contrast personal taxes act only through the IS curve and
hence stabilise output at the expense of in￿ation stability. Only where φ1
is low, so that the monetary authority reacts less forcefully to the in￿ation
shock, do personal taxes help to stabilise output and in￿ation. In other
words, payroll taxes are generally more complementary to monetary policy
in this model.
5 . 3 I n e r t i a lF i s c a lR u l e s
We now turn to the issue of how such automatic stabilizers should be de-

























Figure 7: Inertia and Government Spending Rule
persistent? The literature on the design of monetary policy rules (see Gi-
annoni and Woodford, 2002a,b) shows that inertial monetary policy rules
can, in some circumstances be very bene￿cial. However, in our earlier paper
(Muscatelli et al., 2003), our conjecture was that a lack of co-ordination be-
tween the two policies, especially when both are highly inertial, might cause
a reduction in welfare.
In Figure 7 we show the eﬀect on the variance frontier of changing the
parameter δ1 to 0.9 (high persistence) and to 0.1 (low persistence), whilst
keeping the taxation rule unchanged. In Figure 8, we similarly plot the
variance frontiers when we vary ϕ1 to 0.9 (high persistence) and 0.1 (low
persistence).
Figure 7 in part con￿rms the conjecture in Muscatelli et al. (2003) about
how inertia in government spending, when combined with a highly iner-
tial monetary policy rule might be welfare-reducing. Although the variance
frontier does not shift markedly, it is almost entirely encompassed by the
standard case where δ1 = ϕ1 =0 .6 (labelled ￿both￿). Conversely, lowering
the persistence of government spending produces a variance frontier which























Figure 8: Inertia and Taxation Rule
Figure 8, however, shows that for taxation a high-persistence policy re-
duces both output and in￿ation variability and is closer to being optimal,
given this particular monetary policy rule. By contrast a more countercycli-
cal and less inertial taxation rule tends to raise the variability of both output
and in￿ation. The intuition behind this result lies in the way in which (per-
sonal and payroll) taxation enters the IS curve, in diﬀerence form. A highly
inertial taxation rule approximates an integral control rule, which is par-
ticularly eﬃcient in the case where the output gap depends on the change
in taxation. By decomposing the eﬀect of payroll and personal taxes one
c a na g a i ns h o w ,a sd i s c u s s e da b o v e ,t h a tp a y r o l lt a x e sa r eam o r ee ﬀective
complement to monetary policy.
5.4 The Impact of Rule-of-Thumb Consumers
How robust are our conclusions on the eﬃciency of automatic stabilizers
to changes in the number of rule-of-rhumb consumers? Gal￿ et al. (2002)
￿nd that increasing the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers in a New























Figure 9: Varying the Proportion of Rule-of-Thumb Consumers: Impact of
Fiscal Rules
potentially lead to indeterminacy.
In what follows we show the impact of raising the proportion of employ-
ment made up by rule-of-thumb consumers (NRT/N) to 0.7 (the ￿More ROT
Consumers￿ case), and consequently lowering the proportion of consumption
determined by optimising consumers (Co/C) to 0.571, or lowering the num-
ber of rule-of-rhumb consumers (the ￿Less ROT Consumers￿ case), given by
a value of (NRT/N) equal to 0.275 and a value of (Co/C) equal to 0.88.
We again simulate the model following an in￿ation shock, and as shown
in Figure 9, we see that a lower proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers tends
to stabilise the model. It is important to note that there are two eﬀects at
play here. First, decreasing the number of rule-of-thumb consumers makes
payroll taxes less eﬀective. Second, it improves the degree of consumption
smoothing, and raises the efectiveness of monetary policy by increasing the
term on the interest rate in the IS curve. Clearly this second eﬀect domi-
nates, and causes the variance function to shift towards the origin, albeit by























Figure 10: The Tax Wedge and Automatic Stabilizers
5.5 The Size of the Tax Wedge
As another robustness check, we will examine whether increasing or decreas-
ing the size of the tax wedge in the Phillips Curve tends to improve stabili-
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+ T∗)=0 .01). In Figure 10, we see that, as is
intuitively obvious, increasing the size of the tax wedge tends to improve the
eﬀectiveness of countercyclical taxation policy and hence shifts the variance
frontier towards the origin. This again con￿rms the greater role of payroll
taxes in ￿scal stabilisation in this model. Clearly however, there is a down-
side to this, as a larger tax wedge will also increase the destabilizing impact
of any ￿scal policy deviation from the rule.
276 Conclusions
This paper has provided a ￿rst attempt to model monetary-￿scal interactions
in a New Keynesian context, in which we have allowed for a much richer role
for ￿scal policy compared to recent contributions to this literature. This rep-
resents the ￿rst attempt, to our knowledge, to estimate a NK model which
incorporates liquidity-constrained consumers on US data, and hence the im-
pact of both government spending and taxation on the New Keynesian IS
and Phillips Curve.
Having estimated this DGE model, we have conducted some preliminary
analysis of the interactions between ￿s c a la n dm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi ns u c ha
model, to provide some understanding of the way in which diﬀerent macro-
economic policy instruments interact over the business cycle.
The key conclusions which emerge from our policy analysis is that auto-
matic stabilizers based on taxation policy seem to combine more eﬃciently
with forward-looking inertial monetary policy rules than feedback govern-
ment spending rules. This seems to be largely due to the way in which
taxation (both personal and payroll taxes) enter the model, through the role
played by rule-of-thumb consumers, whose consumption depends on current
disposable income, but whose behaviour impacts on optimising consumers
because of the presence of external habits. This causes the taxation eﬀects
to enter in diﬀerence terms in the IS curve. Interestingly, it also follows that
inertia in ￿scal rules may be more bene￿cial in taxation rules than in gov-
ernment spending rules, and in particular that payroll taxes, which act both
through the tax wedge in the Phillips curve and through the diposable income
of rule-of-thumb consumers, are the most eﬀective ￿scal stabilisation instru-
ment. This result will be examined more systematically in further work, to
examine to what extent the result is robust to changes in the speci￿cation
of the model. In particular, if one were to modify the way in which non-
Ricardian consumers are modeled this will change the way in which taxation
aﬀects the output gap. For instance, by introducing liquidity-constrained
forward-looking consumers one would introduce taxation eﬀects in levels in
the IS curve and this might attenuate some of the bene￿ts of inertial taxation
rules. Clearly introducing some form of liquidity constraint or Blanchard-
Yaari consumers would also introduce a role for wealth, and hence another
channel of monetary-￿scal interaction, through the budget identity. Simi-
larly, introducing greater persistence in external habits might also change
the impact over time of taxation on aggregate demand and might change the
28relative eﬀectiveness of taxation and government spending. Another area
which should be extended is the extent to which monetary policy design
might be aﬀected by the design of the ￿scal rules. In this paper we have
simply taken the monetary policy rule as that estimated from the data for
the post-1982 period, but arguably the monetary authority will modify its
behaviour in the light of changes in ￿scal policy. So one could legitimately
ask the question of how diﬀerent ￿scal rules will perform in the presence of
optimising monetary policymakers. The diﬃculty of this extension is that
the complexity of the framework makes it diﬃcult to derive an appropriate
welfare function for the monetary authorities, so one would need to make
some assumptions regarding the form of the welfare function of the central
bank (cf. Benigno and Woodford, 2003).
A full analysis of how optimal ￿scal rules could be designed for a variety of
diﬀerent monetary policy rules, and how inertia in monetary policy impacts
on the optimal design of ￿scal stabilizers is potentially important. Not only
in the case of the USA which was the subject of the current paper, but more
signi￿cantly in the case of Euroland, where the debate on the optimal degree
of ￿scal activism and the limits which should be imposed on ￿scal stabilizers
is very open. In the UK, the discussion about the appropriate degree of ￿scal
activism has also been prominent in the recent Treasury Assessment on the
impact on the UK of joining EMU (see Westaway, 2003), and merits further
attention.
7 Appendix: derivation of IS and Phillips
curve
We begin with the de￿nition of total demand and total consumption:







t de￿nes the amount of consumption by rule-of-thumb consumers
and CO
t de￿nes the amount of consumption by optimizing consumers. This
is akin to Gal￿ at al. (2002).














where ϑ de￿nes the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers. (we assume
that GTR
t − Tt is uniformly spread across consumers).
We ￿rst turn to the behavior of optimizing consumers.
From equations (1), (2), (3), assuming that all consumers￿ preferences
and their initial holdings of ￿nancial wealth are identical, the problem can
be solved as a dynamic optimization problem and we can aggregate across



















Taking logs we obtain a ￿rst order approximation, where we also omit






















t de￿ne the logs of total consumption.
Then, using the equilibrium condition for goods markets, given that we
ignore investment and the external sector, we can loglinearise equation (17)
in the main text







































































Substituting for c cO








































































































31To complete the model we want to introduce distortionary taxes. We





the total revenues from the payroll tax. Essentially the payroll tax is divided
equally between the labour force. This means that the optimizing consumer￿s




























PR = b t∗ − b n
Then bearing in mind that
ln(MPL)=l n ( 1− α) − αln(N)
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we can then substitute for
¡
d w − p
¢
into(27) to obtain equation (10).
The derivation of the Phillips Curve for the model structure set out in the
main text is outlined in detailed in Gal￿ et al. (2001) and Leith and Malley
(2002), and will not be reproduced here for reasons of space. The introduction
of the payroll tax, however, changes the de￿nition of the percentage change
from steady state of the labour cost share, b st. Substituting for
¡
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+ b nt − b yt. T h i sy i e l d so u rm o d i ￿ed
version of the Phillips Curve including the tax wedge (11).
Data Appendix
327.1 Data deﬁnitions
The data employed are quarterly observations, seasonally adjusted where
available. The variables are expressed in deviations from the steady state,
so real-sector variables are detrended, whilst the series on in￿ation and the
nominal interest rate (the federal funds rate) are demeaned, using the respec-
tive sample average. For detrending, we experimented with both a Hodrick-
Prescott ￿lter and regression on a polynomial (cubic) trend for the real vari-
ables, and using Congressional Budget Oﬃce￿s and OECD (Economic Out-
look) data for potential output and the output gap, respectively. The results
reported use a HP trend (λ = 1600). All variables except interest rates are
expressed in logs.
The government spending data (G) is federal government spending ex-
cluding transfers and net interest payments, whilst we use employers￿ social
security contributions as a proxy for payroll taxes (T ∗), and government
t r a n s f e r sm i n u sp e r s o n a lt a x e sa s( GTR−T). The wage series is the index of
average weekly earnings.
The output gap is de￿ned as the (log) diﬀerence between actual and
potential output. In￿ation is the 4-quarter (log) diﬀerence in the Consumer
Price Index. The monetary policy instrument is the Federal Funds Rate.
Real series were obtained by dividing nominal series by the GDP implicit
price de￿ator.
7.2 Time-series’ sources
The data on actual and potential output, the implicit price de￿ator, fed-
eral government spending, federal (total) government debt, tax revenues,
social security contributions, federal government transfers and net interest
payments are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis￿ NIPA Tables. (See
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn1.htm). Civilian employment, weekly earn-
ings and weekly hours of work are all seasonally adjusted series from the
OECD Main Economic Indicators.
In￿ation is the 4-quarter (log) diﬀerence in the Consumer Price Index,
derived from OECD Main Economic Indicators￿ CPI, all items, seasonally
adjusted series. The call money rate is the Federal Funds￿ rate, obtained
from IMF￿s IFS. The IMF Commodity Price Index was used to compute the
rate of change of commodity prices.
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